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Introduction
Many Latin American nations have recently implemented liberal trade regimes, often as part of a larger set of market-oriented reforms, and have abandoned their industrialisation policies based on import-substitution. In the 1980s, Chile, Mexico and Bolivia where among the continent's first nations to slash tariff rates and virtually eliminate quantitative restrictions on imports. They were followed little later by many others, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago. All these countries are now much more exposed to international competition than ever before.
In the context of this new openness to trade, discussions about the international "harmonisation" of a minimum set of labour standards have moved to the forefront of the Latin American policy agenda. There is indeed a growing feeling among many government officials that the continent's high unemployment partly results from "unfair" trade practices abroad. In particular, it is alleged that many East Asian nations deliberately restrict labour rights in order to gain a special competitive advantage, stimulate exports and attract inflows of foreign direct investment. This is why governments in Argentina, Chile or Uruguay have decided to provide some support for a "social clause" in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 1 . But is this a good idea? Are labour rights really more restricted in export-oriented Asian nations than they are in Latin America? And if yes, are Latin American workers prejudiced by Asia's lower standards? These are the main questions addressed in this paper.
The paper has two objectives. The first, in section 1, is to present a brief description of core international labour standards promoted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), as well as to provide an overview of the ratification and -when possible-the enforcement of these standards in Asia and Latin America. As pointed out by the OECD Secretariat (OECD, 1996, p.48) , it is "difficult to make an overall assessment of the degree of enforcement of core labour standards across countries. Information on this issue is sparse and incomplete. The lack of reliable indicators on enforcement is especially acute regarding child labour, forced labour and non-discrimination in employment". Nevertheless, the evidence that is available confirms the intuition that in general the implementation of labour rights is weaker in Asia -and especially in East Asia-than in Latin America.
The second objective of the paper, in Section 2, is to discuss -and provide some evidenceon possible linkages between labour standards, international trade, and foreign investment. In particular, the paper defends the view that -in theory-there are three plausible ways for weak Asian labour rights to hurt Latin American employment. The first is by increasing Latin American low skilled labour-intensive manufacturing imports from Asia; the second is by making Latin American manufacturing exports less competitive; and the third is by diverting foreign investment away from Latin America. The question of the magnitude of these effects, however, is an empirical matter. And this is why the paper also offers a quick overview of the available -but contradictory and ambiguous-evidence. Finally, policy implications are discussed.
Labour standards and working conditions in Asia and Latin America & Caribbean:
a comparative perspective
Ratification and enforcement of ILO Conventions
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) was created in 1919 by the treaty of Versailles. Its aim is to promote world peace through social justice by encouraging as many countries as possible to ratify and enforce international labour standards. These standards -which are designed to establish a minimum level of labour conditions across countries-are codified in 181 "Conventions" that create international legal obligations and which, together, form the so-called "international labour code" 2 . Most Conventions are accompanied by one or more non-binding "Recommendations".
In principle, once international labour standards are ratified they become part of individual countries' set of domestic labour rules and laws that are generally written into labour codes or industrial relations acts (Plant, 1994; OECD, 1996) . It is thus only insofar as ILO Conventions find a way into countries' national law books that they become part of the normative framework which effectively regulates working conditions and industrial relations. It is important to remember this basic observation because what ultimately determines the economic effects of labour standards is not the ratification of treaties but the implementation of the principles that they embody. This link between the ratification of ILO Conventions and the improvement in labour conditions can be broken in at least two ways: first, labour standards may be quickly adopted but poorly enforced, so that workers in many countries may face bad labour conditions even though the country has ratified many ILO Conventions. This is a widespread problem, especially since there is no mechanism that allows the ILO to take any sanctions. Second, it is possible that workers in a country with few ILO ratifications, like for example the U.S. (which has ratified only 15 out of the 181 Conventions), enjoy decent labour conditions anyway, either because the country has good domestic labour regulations or simply because the country is in an advanced stage of economic development.
2 International labour standards are classified by the ILO itself into no less than 14 categories: basic human rights, employment policy, social policy, human resources development, social security, labour administration, labour relations, conditions of work, employment of women, employment of children and young persons, older workers, migrant workers, indigenous and tribal people, workers in non-metropolitan territories, and particular occupational sectors
Core international standards and human rights
Recent studies on the globalisation of the world economy have discussed whether free trade should be conditional upon the harmonisation of a certain number of labour standards (see, for example, Hudec, 1996 or OECD, 1996) . Such studies have generally emphasised the distinction between core and non-core labour standards, reflecting the growing consensus that what should be discussed at the multilateral level, if anything, is the harmonisation of the former type of standards (Langille, 1997; Maskus, 1997) . According to the OECD (1996) and to the Declaration of the World Social Summit in Copenhagen, 1995, the minimum set of core -or fundamental-labour rights includes the following principles: 1) the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining 2) the prohibition of exploitative forms of child labour 3) the prohibition of forced labour 4) the prohibition of discrimination in employment and remuneration All these rights relate, although sometimes imperfectly, to seven fundamental ILO Conventions (see table 1) . It is often argued that -since human rights are universal-such core labour standards should be enforced throughout the world independently of political, economic, social or cultural factors. It is also sometimes assumed that the respect for these core standards will "pave the way" for the establishment of better working conditions and wages (OECD, 1996) . The first impression we thus get is that Latin American & Caribbean nations seem to care more about core labour standards than Asian countries. However, as pointed out above, this impression could be misleading. In principle ILO Conventions could be poorly implemented in Venezuela or in the Dominican Republic -which have both ratified 100% of core Conventions-and labour conditions in Korea and China -which have ratified only one Convention-may be better as its low ratification rate suggests. More detailed evidence is therefore offered in the follwing sub-sections. Source: ILO (1998) As illustrated in figure 5, these differences are not just on paper! They quite strongly reflect the reality of industrial relations in the two regions (even though they somewhat distort the picture in a favourable way for Latin American countries). According to information by the OECD (1996) , it is possible to establish more or less independent unions or workers' organisations in 61% of all Latin American & Caribbean countries but only in 21% of Asian countries. This finding confirms the World Bank's view according to which, in East Asia, there is "an active government role in repressing labour organisations" and "although complete bans have been rare, governments have employed extensive definitions of essential industries or services in which organising is banned (often including export processing zones), instituted onerous provisions for union registration, provided weak (or no) protection for union organisers and, in some cases, have been guilty of the most serious human rights abuses against independent labour leaders" (1995c, p.26).
As for Latin America, -where, it has to be pointed out, the situation is still far from perfectthe association between the ratification of ILO Conventions and the practice of industrial relations has clearly improved over time. In many countries, the right to establish free unions is a by-product of the recent democratisation process of the political system and of Constitutional changes that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Before these changes, Latin American States typically displayed a high degree of protection for the individual worker, but repressive attitudes towards unionsperceived as communist or anarchist threats (see Bronstein, 1995) . Source: OECD (1996)
Child labour
The objective of Convention 138 is to eliminate child labour. It requires signatory parties to set a minimum age for employment that is no lower than the age for completing compulsory schooling. As a general rule, this minimum age should be no lower than 15 -or 14 in developing countries. But for "light work" the age can be lowered to respectively 13 and 12. On the other hand, for hazardous work likely to jeopardise the "health, safety or morals" of young persons the minimum age is generally 18. Convention 138 allows some exceptions for activities which raise special practical problems of application like family undertaking. Note that there is currently no international consensus on whether this ILO Convention really embodies a fundamental labour right.
In particular, it is pointed out that the Convention does not distinguish between "exploitative" and "non-exploitative" forms of child labour. This is why the ILO has drafted in 1998 a new Convention focusing on the elimination of "intolerable forms" of child labour. The definitive version of this new Convention should be opened to ratification in 1999, after approval by the 87th International Labour Conference. This difference in absolute numbers is massive. It reflects to a large extent demographic factors:
there are about 10 times more children in Asia than in Latin America. And when comparing child labour incidence -the share of child workers as a proportion of a country's total number of childrenthe difference is somewhat less compelling. Indeed, child labour incidence is only about 30% higher in Asia than in Latin America: 21.1% instead of 16.5%. There is nothing wrong, however, with minor community work, military service, or with prison labour that is carried out "under the supervision and control of a public authority". Convention 105
is about the suppression of politically motivated forced labour, as found in many former Latin American military regimes or socialist countries ("gulags"). It prohibits forced work "as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views"; "as a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development"; "as a means of labour discipline"; "as a punishment for having participated in strikes"; and "as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination" (Article 1). and Recommendations", the ILO itself considers that "child slavery (...) has long been reported from South and South-East Asia and West Africa, and despite vigorous official denial of its existence it is both common and well-documented" (ILO, 1996, p.15) . Source: ILO (1998)
Discrimination
Convention 100 and Convention 111 are about the elimination of discrimination in wages and employment. Conventions 100 is very simple and clear. It stipulates an obligation for member countries to ensure that men and women who perform work of equal value receive equal remuneration (Article 2). Convention 111 goes one step further and requires members to "promote" equal occupational and employment opportunities for all individuals, whatever "race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin" (Article 1).
Here again, 91% of Latin American & Caribbean countries have ratified both Conventions and all nations have ratified at least one, compared respectively to 37% and 68% of Asian countries.
There is no evidence to confirm that -in practice-discriminations are more frequent in Asian than in Latin American labour markets. According to UNDP (1995) estimates, average wages of women relative to men seem to be relatively similar in both regions. However, women's participation in industry is almost twice as high in Asia (37% of all hours worked) as it is in Latin America (20% of all hours worked), indicating that any possible systematic gender-based discrimination might occur on a larger scale in Asia (UNDP, 1995).
-13 - Economic research in this area is still rather scarce and controversial. The first major study on the subject was undertaken by the OECD Secretariat in June 1994 and published two years later (OECD, 1996) . Its main finding is that core labour standards have a positive effect on economic efficiency and development, but that they have no effect whatsoever on international trade or foreign investment. All developing countries are thus invited to respect workers' basic human rights, and
Latin American countries are -implicitly-summoned not to care about Asian labour standards and to keep the "social clause" issue out of the WTO. A similar recommendation emerges from a World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (Maskus, 1997) .
Such conclusions, however, fly in the face of an old intuition according to which labour standards -and especially the right to collective bargaining (with all its implications)-have at least some effect on international trade. The ILO Constitution states that "...the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries" (quoted in Sengenberger, 1994) . Similarly, the 1947
Havana Charter of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) -which was intended to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) but was never ratified by the U.S. Congressdeclared that "unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international trade" (quoted in Rodrik, 1995).
-15 -Even though resource endowment and technology are clearly the most important determinants of trade, it is widely recognised that government policies can modify comparative advantage (see, for example, Markusen et al., 1995) . Thus, as pointed out by the OECD itself, it is far from unreasonable to assume that the denial of core standards can be used to "prolong or strengthen an existing comparative advantage, and, in some instances, create a new one" (OECD, 1996, p.97) . The following sections defend the view that there are three plausible ways for low Asian standards to hurt employment mainly for low skilled workers in Latin America & the Caribbean. The first is by increasing Latin American imports from Asia; the second is by making Latin American manufacturing exports less competitive in third markets; and the third is by diverting foreign investment away from Latin America.
Latin American imports from East Asia
Because of rich endowment in land and natural resources, Latin America's comparative advantage is in processed and unprocessed primary goods, while East Asia's advantage is in basic manufactures. This is at least the impression one gets when looking at trade data for the two regions. It is indeed a fact of life that Latin American exports tend to include a higher share of processed and unprocessed primary goods relative to manufactures than East Asian exports (Wood and Berge, 1997) . How, then, would one expect restrictions on labour rights in Asia to affect bilateral trade between the two regions? The answer is simple. Insofar as such restriction reduce labour costs -and thus production costs-they will lead to an increase in Latin American imports of the now cheaper basic manufactures from Asia (Rodrik, 1995) . And as a result, some mainly low skilled Latin American workers will lose their jobs. On the other hand, however, we would also expect a corresponding increase in Latin American exports of processed and unprocessed primary goods towards Asia -and the creation of new employment opportunities in that sector. Overall, low
East Asian standards can thus be seen as just another source of trade creation.
Between 1980 and 1994, Latin American imports from East Asia have indeed been multiplied by 8, so that nowadays nearly 10% of all Latin American imports come from East Asia compared with 3.1% in 1980 (UNCTAD, 1996) . The main reason for this increase is certainly a reduction in trade barriers among the two regions. But part of this trade expansion may also be due to Asia's low standards. Few trade economists dispute this possibility. What they argue, however, is that such an increase in bilateral trade -whether due to differences in the enforcement of labour rights or anything else-is beneficial for Latin America (see for example Krugman, 1997 or Rodrik, 1995 To be sure to reap the gains from trade, countries must fulfil a certain number of conditions which are rarely met in Latin America. In particular, there must be a flexible labour market that is ready to re-absorb workers displaced from import-competing sectors, for example in the expanding primary processing industry. Unfortunately, both the notorious rigidity of the Latin American labour market, and the fact that primary processing is less labour-intensive than basic manufacturing (Owens and Wood, 1997) . And, if such is the case, the traditional gains from trade must be balanced against the losses associated with the non-utilisati on of a part of the country's human resources.
Latin American exports to third markets
North-South manufacturing trade models generally consider that the North has a comparative advantage in technology and skill-intensive products, while the South has an advantage in low skilled labour-intensive goods (see for example Wood, 1994 ). In such a framework both East Asia and Latin America are generally considered as part of the South. Indeed, apart from land and natural resources, the two regions have similar factor endowments: most workers have only a basic level of education but a fairly-well developed infrastructure (Wood, 1997a) . Thus, within the manufacturing sector both regions tend to specialize in the same kind of low skilled labour-intensive products (textiles, clothing, footwear, electronics, etc...). In Argentina and Colombia, for example, these products of medium and low skill intensity account for about 80% of manufacturing exports (Londero and Teitel, 1996) . The implication is that -as globalization proceeds-one would expect both region to expand their exports of labour-intensive manufactures to the North -providing many new job opportunities for the low skilled in the formal sector and reducing unemployment.
In 1990, however, Latin American countries exported only 11.6% of all manufacturing exports by developing countries, compared to 82.7% by Asian countries (Page, 1994) . This means that, in export markets, Latin American firms have been "outperformed" by Asian companies. There are certainly many reasons for this. But it is conceivable that the weaker enforcement of labour rights in East Asia is one of them. Indeed, by allowing Asian companies to enjoy "artificially" low production costs, it is possible that low standards -just like a currency devaluation-have induced third countries to import more of their labour-intensive manufactures from Asia rather than Latin
America. This is very unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, because it reduces Latin America's real income and makes it hard for the continent to follow the World Bank's advice to diversify its exports away from natural resources into basic manufactures (World Bank, 1995a) . Second, because it reduces demand for Latin American low skilled workers, and thus -given the continent's already mentionned labour market rigidity-increases unemployment and the size of the urban informal sector.
It is essential, at this stage, to notice that the suppression of labour rights in a group of developing countries increases the competitiveness of that group's exports only at the expense of nations with a similar export structure. Indeed, exported goods must be substitutable. This means that OECD firms -which tend to specialise in a more technology and skill-intensive brand of manufactures-are not affected by Asian labour standards in the same way than Latin American countries are. The only way weak Asian labour rights affect OECD countries is by reducing the price of its imports, improving its terms of trade. This points to the fact that the South-South dimension of the international trade and labour standards issue is even more thorny than the NorthSouth dimension of the question.
Foreign direct investment, the race to the bottom, and export processing zones
Since the end of the 1980s, FDI flows to developing countries have increased impressively.
According to the World Bank (1996) , developing countries' share of global FDI has risen from 12% in 1990 to 38% in 1995. This is because new technologies and cheaper transports have led to the spread of vertical integration in manufacturing; affiliates of multinational companies are no more only replicas of the parent companies, producing for the local market, but are increasingly becoming a specialised part of the multinationals' production chain. In other words, OECD firms are shifting their low skilled labour-intensive activities -especially assembly work-to poor countries where labour costs are low. Such a "delocalisation" of part of the production process is designed to reduce costs and keep multinationals competitive in world markets. A well-known example is the assembly- Mello, 1997) . Here again, there are certainly many reasons for this trend. But one of these may be that multinationals tend to set up affiliates in countries where labour standards -and therefore production costs-are lower, increasing the rate of returns to investment. In other words, the absence of labour rights may divert foreign investmentand employment creation for low skilled workers-away from Latin America. As a result these nations will also enjoy less of the benefits generally associated with foreign investment, among which technology transfers, improvement of workers' skills and management techniques, increased demand for domestic inputs, and higher tax revenues (Maskus, 1997) .
Note that it is often feared that that international competition for capital could trigger a "race to the bottom" among developing countries, which is a situation where nations compete for foreign investment by restricting labour rights. It is true that any country which has a pre-existing tendency to attract little capital might have an incentive to lower its labour standards (Krugman, 1997) . International harmonisation of labour standards would be useful to make sure that such an outcome is avoided. Especially since the simple fear by governments that high standards may discourage foreign investment may lead to the decision to restrict labour rights (Wilson, 1994) . This is especially true in Export Processing Zones (EPZ), which now exist all over the developing world. Such special zones are clearly major actors in the intra-South competition for foreign investment. In 1990, about 50% of multinational companies' total employment in developing countries were located in EPZs, providing typically between 60% and 80% of jobs within such regions (OECD, 1996) . In EPZs, restrictions of collective bargaining rights are frequent and most of the work is performed by non-unionised women (Maskus, 1997 and OECD, 1996) . Moreover, when labour laws are not restricted governments often fail to enforce them properly. This however seems to be as true in Latin America and Caribbean countries as it is in Asia. However, the overall impact of such practices may be of more consequence in Asia -where 64% of world-wide EPZ employment is located (OECD, 1996) and where EPZs account for much of the manufacturing export growth.
Empirical evidence
The above sections have explained how in principle Latin America may suffer from low East Asian labour standards. But in the end, the extent to which international differences in labour standards affect the competitive position of nations is an empirical issue, on which much more research is certainly needed to reach a consensus. This section presents a quick overview of the main -generally contradictory-evidence available so far.
l Does the implementation of labour standards increase unit labour costs 7 ? This is a critical question for if standards do not affect labour costs -and thus production costs-there is no reason why they should have any effect on trade or foreign investment. Available evidence is ambiguous. Rodrik (1995), using cross-country analysis with data on labour costs for 40 countries (and controlling for productivity), finds that labour costs tend to increase significantly as standards become more stringent. Rama (1995) also uncovers a positive -though small-association between a country's number of ILO ratifications and the annual growth rate of labour costs in the manufacturing sector. As for Seguino (1997) , she contends that in Korea the average female wage is typically about half the average male wage. Assuming that 20% of this wage difference reflects gender-based discrimination -as seems to be the case in the U.S. (see Filer et al., 1996) -it is possible to infer as a very rough approximation that gender-discrimination reduces employers' labour costs by about 10%. This may have an important impact on production costs, especially when considering that in Korea all the largest export-oriented industries are female dominated: they form 72.9% of all apparel employees, 62.5% of all textiles employees, and 52.6% of electronics employees (Seguino, 1997)!
The OECD (1996), on the other hand, finds no correlation at all between freedom of association and labour costs. This last result is, however, rather surprising. It is indeed well established that -within countries-unionised workers receive higher wages than non-unionised 7 "unit labour costs" are labour costs per unit of production workers, and that as a result of collective bargaining average unit labour costs in low skilled labourintensive activities typically increase by about 5%-15% (Filer et al., 1996) . Such activities are precisely the ones that account for most of developing countries' exports. As for child labour, the ILO (1996) contends that in it generates a labour cost savings (as a share of the product's final price) of about 5% for bangles and 5% to 10% for carpets.
l Do labour standards affect trade patterns and export performance? An increase in unit labour costs should in principle translate into an increase in the price of a country's goods on international markets -unless there is a corresponding currency depreciation. Thus, if labour standards affect labour costs, they should also affect trade flows. But here again evidence is contradictory. The OECD (1996) finds that no clear relationship exists between labour standards and sectoral trade patterns or export performance (i.e. the share of manufacturing exports in world trade). Indeed, consistently with its findings that standards have no effect on labour costs, the OECD finds that prices of U.S. textile imports from developing countries are rather uniform. This, so the OECD, suggests that differences in the degree of freedom of association plays little role in the determination of export prices and thus export performance. According to the Secretariat of the Paris-based institution, most of the low to medium-income countries have exhibited export dynamism irrespective of their level of core labour standards. It recognises that some countries where freedom of association has recently been strengthened (Argentina, Korea, and Taipei) have suffered a loss in export competitiveness, but reckons that this was mainly due to labour shortages and currency appreciation -both of which pushed up manufacturing labour costs in the 1980s. Other studies contradict the OECD's view. Mah (1997) , for example, shows that the ratification of ILO core Conventions -apart from the Conventions on forced labour-worsens developing countries' export performance (as proxied by the value of exports/GDP). In such countries, he finds that it is especially the ratification of the Conventions on freedom of association and non-discrimination that strongly deteriorates export competitiveness. By contrast, the negative effect of ILO Conventions on exports is not found in developed countries. Presumably this is because they are specialised in skill and technologyintensive products -in which the share of labour cost in production cost is much lower than in labour-intensive sectors and in which competition is based on product differentiation rather than on pure price competitiveness. Similarly, Rodrik (1995) finds that -even though not very strong-his empirical results are supportive of the hypothesis that low standards can help create a comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods such as textiles and clothing. In accordance with Mah's results, he finds that this is mainly true for countries with a GDP/capita smaller than 6,000 U.S dollars.
l Do labour standards affect the location of foreign investment? Here evidence is made of 2 pieces. First, there is some evidence that labour costs determine the location of multinationals within the developing world. Indeed, empirical research confirms the intuition that labour costs are a statistically significant determinant of foreign investment -especially in labour-intensive and exportoriented industries (for a quick summary of the literature on the determinants of foreign investment to low-income countries see ODI, 1997) . This is confirmed in two recent studies by Riker (1997a and 1997b) . They find that within multinationals labour demand in each affiliate is related to the cost and demand conditions of other affiliates owned by the same firm. For example a 10% fall in Mexican labour costs typically leads U.S. multinationals to reduce their Malaysian workforce by 1.6%. In the electronics industry, in particular, a 10% decline in wages in one developing country leads to an 3.7% employment increase in the affiliate located in that country, and a 6.3% fall in employment in affiliates located in other developing countries. These results suggest that it is indeed the case that workers in developing countries compete with each other to perform labour-intensive work, and that standards -insofar as they affect labour costs-have the power to shift employment from one developing country to another.
Second, some (few) studies have tried to assess directly the effect of labour standards on foreign investment flows. Here the evidence is not only very scarce but also once again ambiguous.
The OECD (1996) finds that empirical evidence on the links between FDI and core labour standards "remains open to different interpretations" and concludes that "while core labour standards may not be systematically absent from investment decisions of OECD investors in favour of non-OECD destinations, aggregate FDI data suggests that core labour standards are not primary factors in the majority of investment decisions of OECD companies (...). In these circumstances, host countries may be able to enforce core labour standards without risking negative repercussions on FDI flows" (pp.123-124). The problem, unfortunately, is that the OECD study fails to distinguish between two types of foreign investment: local-market oriented investment within OECD countries (which still represents the majority of FDI flows), and cost-saving North-South investment (discussed above). Rodrik (1996) , when restricting the sample to developing countries, finds a weak but positive relationship between low labour standards and inflows of foreign investment and concludes that labour standards do affect foreign investment (p.21). Here again, much more research is certainly needed to settle the debate.
-22 -
A "social clause" in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ?
For the sake of the argument, let's assume three things: a) low Asian labour standards do have an effect on trade and foreign investment flows; b) this is bad for Latin American nations because it increases unemployment among low skilled workers. How, then, could Latin American countries convince East-Asia's export-oriented nations to ratify and enforce more of the ILO's core
Conventions? The first option, as always, is to apply diplomatic pressure and use the force of persuasion. A second option -which would need to be carefully assessed and whose evaluation is outside the scope of this paper-is to provide (or continue to provide) support for the introduction of a "social clause" in the World Trade Organisation.
Such a "social clause" would make it possible to restrict imports of goods produced abroad under conditions that violate the principles embodied in core ILO standards. As pointed out by Maskus (1997) , there are three main routes for introducing labour standards in the WTO. The first is an expansion of Article XX which states a few general exemptions to the basic rule of nondiscrimination. Article XX(e), in particular, permits WTO members to unilaterally ban imports made by prison labour. It would in principle be easy to extend this possibility to goods made by bonded children, discriminated women, or by workers who are unable to bargain collectively. A second route would be to extend the interpretation of Article VI so as to treat the lack of respect for basic labour rights in export sectors or in EPZs as a form of "export subsidisation" or "social dumping" to which countries could respond in the same way as they respond to other forms of "dumping": through countervailing duties (Rodrik, 1995; Charnovitz, 1992) . Finally, the third route would be to negotiate a separate multilateral agreement that would make it compulsory for WTO members to enforce basic labour rights. In case the agreement is violated any WTO member could invoke Article XXIII and call for the suspension of trade benefits.
Of course, the introduction of a social clause in the WTO is very controversial, and many counter-arguments have been advanced. The first problem with a "social clause" is its possibly discriminatory use. Indeed, the threat of trade restrictions is very much an instrument of power politics in international relations. And as such, a "social clause" -if opened to unilateral action-can be expected to be used mainly by powerful nations to induce weaker countries to implement better standards. Even though most countries would certainly be quick to act against Fiji, there is little perspective for action against China. Such a problem could be avoided only if it is agreed that the -23 -suspension of trade benefits has to be decided multilaterally at the end of an agreed disputesettlement process. The second problem -pointed out by many governments in developing countriesis that the "social clause" could in principle be "hijacked" by import competing lobbies. Such groups would make use of a "social clause" with the unique intention to raise tariffs against export-oriented countries and destroy their comparative advantage. In the words of Bhagwati (1994, p.60) : "blue protectionism is breaking out, masked behind a moral facade". But one must be careful not to exaggerate this danger. Intelligently implemented, a social clause could probably avoid such an outcome. As pointed out by Freeman (1996, p.14) , this protectionist argument is a little bit a "red herring" in this debate. Finally, the third problem is that such a clause may be used against Latin
American countries themselves in case their own enforcement of standards is judged unsatisfying.
Indeed not all of the continent's nations enforce core labour rights in an entirely satisfactory way.
The case of Uruguay provides a nice illustration of the problem. Indeed, while the Uruguayan trade minister supports the introduction of labour standards in the WTO, the OECD Secretariat (1996) considers that it is impossible to establish independent workers' organisation in that country. If the OECD conclusion is still true today, pressing for a social clause is really a shot in one's own foot since Uruguay may be the first country against which the new "social clause" might be used. .
In any case, the introduction of such a clause in the WTO would require the negotiation of a new legal framework, unanimously approved by member countries. Given the strong opposition by many Asian countries 8 as well as by some industrialised countries 9 it is unlikely that such a clause be adopted soon. So far the only step forward was made during the 1994 Marrakech Ministerial meeting, where a commitment for further deliberation on this issue within the WTO was agreed on.
During the 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore, however, Ministers have affirmed their support for core standards but have ruled out further work on this issue in the WTO. They have also rejected the use of trade measures to enforce labour rights. But ignoring the issue will presumably not make it go away.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has discussed the issue of Asia's "unfair" competition to Latin America, based on the observation that fundamental labour rights are better enforced in the Latin America. This is obviously a very big generalisation. Some Latin American & Caribbean countries still have a long way to go before labour rights can be considered as appropriately guaranteed. According to the OECD (1996) , it is for example impossible to establish free unions in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, or Uruguay. There is no apparent reason why the denial of the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining in those countries should not also be considered as "unfair competition" to Latin American countries or -indeed-to Asian countries with higher standards.
This being said, the connection between labour standards, trade, foreign investment and employment is one of the most controversial issues in academia. And there is no doubt that much more research is needed, especially on the South-South dimension of this issue. This is because there is a strong likelihood that labour standards differences divert trade and foreign investment mainly among developing countries. And if there is a danger of a "race to the bottom" it is thus probably mainly within the South. This is somewhat ironical since -in the terms of Bhagwati (1994, p.57 )-the issue is currently "resurrecting the North-South divide that afflicted the world economy in the late 1970s". Indeed, most of the public debate and much of the research has so far focused on the role of labour standards in trade and investment flows between industrialised countries and the developing world. This reflects the presumption that the North is the main victim of the South's low labour standards. But this is almost surely wrong. The countries that suffer the most from the weak enforcement of core labour rights in China or Indonesia are almost certainly other developing countries with higher standards. These are the countries which should find it in their interest to support some form of international harmonisation of labour standards.
9 Among others: Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Germany and Spain
